Delegates left Baku with very mixed emotions. The overwhelming feeling was relief that a deal had been reached, at past the last hour, and the Paris climate regime lives to fight another day. But equally a huge sense of frustration and often anger, especially from many poorer developing countries, of the huge compromises they had been forced to make to ensure the multilateral process survived.
The power dynamics in Baku were brutal for poor, vulnerable nations. They faced a grim ultimatum: either agree to a relatively low financial offer of support from developed countries or risk the collapse of the only international process where they have a significant voice and influence. In the face of Trump’s election, they chose to keep the UN climate process alive but their on-going support will depend on the “Baku to Belem” finance roadmap being seen to deliver.
There are five main lessons we can take from COP29:
1. Multilateralism is seen as valuable if it delivers tangible short term benefits
The first lesson of Baku is that even in a more geopolitical world the majority of countries see the value of multilateralism, but only if it delivers tangible benefits they can see in the short term.
2. Domestic politics are reducing the space for international agreement
The second lesson of Baku is that as climate action becomes more visible and economically impactful, international commitments are becoming more contentious in domestic politics thus reducing the space for international agreement.
Domestic politics had a stronger presence in the negotiating rooms than ever before. Developed countries enacting budget cuts and tax rises at home were highly sensitive about creating political vulnerabilities by pledging major new funding. With the US government unlikely to contribute any finance during the Trump presidency, overall ambition was always going to be limited. It was also critical that traditional donor countries could go home saying that rising economies like China and the Gulf states could contribute to the agreed goal. While all these countries do in reality provide significant climate finance flows, they were unwilling to have this included inside any UN goal as a point of principle.
The need to reconcile these conflicting demands resulted in a final text which caused India to object to the agreement for what it saw as breaking longstanding UNFCCC principles on equity which are the cornerstone of its domestic debates.
3. No one geopolitical relationship defines climate negotiations
The third lesson of Baku is that coalitions are highly fluid and talk of the world dividing into competing US and Chinese-led blocks is highly simplistic. No one geopolitical relationship defines the climate negotiations.
The US and China were present but not dominant in Baku. They protected their core interests. The US to ensure a regime they thought a future pro-climate action US government could support. China to limit pressure for high emissions cuts and to burnish their credentials as a supporter of multilateralism. Meanwhile Saudi Arabia worked with other fossil fuel exporters to try and rollback last year’s progress on fossil fuel phase out.
But the core deal was done between the Europeans, as the largest donors, and groups representing the most vulnerable and poorest countries who had most to lose from failure.
4. Delivering ambitious action in a time of multipolar multilateralism is very difficult
The fourth lesson from Baku is that delivering ambitious action in a time of multipolar multilateralism is very difficult. It requires creative diplomacy and investment in relationships outside the negotiating rooms, and deft handling inside them. The lack of both this year contributed to the near failure of Baku. Countries are still doing climate diplomacy on the cheap, with tiny teams and weak engagement, despite its growing complexity and national economic importance.
5. Progress was made at COP29 in strengthening the global climate regime
The final lesson from Baku was that despite the geopolitical headwinds, diplomatic drama, and obvious process failings, real progress was made in strengthening the global climate regime.
The final outcome not only commits to mobilise much more funding for developing countries but also positions the UNFCCC as a key political forum for driving global financial reform across institutions like the World Bank and IMF. Regular monitoring and stocktakes of the scale, quality and regional distribution of public and private climate financing will provide a new motor for change over the next decade. This has built on progress driven from the G20 and ad hoc summitry over the past three years.
This roadmap for change was what cemented the coalition for agreement in Baku. It does not guarantee results but does give countries outside the G20, and marginalised in financial institutions, greater leverage to pursue their interests.
When countries see that making multilateralism work is the best strategy for achieving their interests then it is amazing what can be agreed – but the hard work of making these agreements deliver starts now.
